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A Critique of the Neo-classical Theory of Foreign
Investment
Until a few years ago, the theoretical literature
on direct foreign investment (DFI) was extremely
limited, reflecting the failure of international
trade theory to break with the Ricardian assump-
tion of factor immobility between countries. Dur-
ing the 1960s a body of literature developed
which conskbered the implications of foreign in-
vestment for home and host countries, stemming
from McDougall's seminal article on 'The
Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from
Abroad'.1 This corpus I shall refer to as the neo-
classical theory of DFI.
The basic conclusion of this approach is that, in
general, foreign investment is beneficial to the
host country, in the sense that it increases income
accruing to that country, and should be en-
couraged.2 Within such a framework, it is difficult
to see what role can be played by bargaining by
the host country government. It is necessary there-
fore to begin with a critique of the empirical
validity of the assumptions on which the neo-
classical theory is based.
In the first place, perfect competition is assumed,
and, where it is discussed at all, only lip-service is
paid to the need to recognize the predominance
of oligopoly. In practice, foreign investment is
closely associated with oligopoly. The bulk of the
main capitalist countries' overseas investment is
accounted for by a relatively small number of
firms. Between 250 and 300 US firms account for
more than 70 per cent of that country's invest-
ment, while in the United Kingdom 165 firms
control 80 per cent, and in West Germany 82
firms control 70 per cent, of all foreign invest-
ment.3 Moreover, many studies have shown that
foreign investment tends to be particularly heavy
in the more oligopolistic sectors of industry.
The second assumption, which is implicit rather
than explicit, is the identification of foreign in-
vestment with the export of capital. In fact this
1 Reprinted in Dunning (ed), International Investment, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1972.
2 In a subsequent note Kemp showed that in fact there may
be a case for a tax on foreign investment analogous to the
optimum tariff in international trade. Set Kemp in Dunning,
op. cit.
3 UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development, p. 7.
assumption is more appropriate to the model of
portfolio investment than that of direct foreign
investment. It is by now clear that direct foreign
investment comes in the form of a package which
includes technology, and management as well as
capital. Indeed, the package may include very
little capital, since multinational corporations
often prefer to raise capital locally rather than
export it from the parent company.4 Hirschman5
has indicated that this identification with capital
movements has been an important source of bias
in the literature on foreign investment, particularly
in underdeveloped countries. As long as invest-
ment is considered as a movement of capital to a
capital-short country, its beneficial effects as a
complement to local resources are highlighted.
Once direct foreign investment is recognized as a
package, the possibility that it may have an
adverse effect is more evident.
A further assumption, related to the two previous
ones, is that of perfect knowledge. Yet the fact
that neither of the previous assumptions holds
makes nonsense of perfect knowledge. The
oligopoly position of the major multinational
corporations is based, at least in part, on their
control of information through patents and in-
dustrial secrets. Moreover, once it is accepted that
foreign investment involves a package which
includes technology as well as capital, the nature
of the technology market as a market in informa-
tion must be taken into account. In this market
information cannot be freely available. A related
assumption is that of certainty of expectations (or
at least that all alternatives can be reduced to
certainty equivalents). The recognition of oligop-
oly invalidates this assumption too, since the
interdependence of firms' behaviour introduces an
element of uncertainty which cannot be reduced
to certainty equivalents. The fact that they operate
in an uncertain environment is an important
element in understanding the strategies of multi-
national corporations in the area of foreign in-
vestment.
An alternative analysis of direct foreign invest-
ment which emphasizes both the package nature
4 Between 1957 end 1964, only 11.8 per cent of total US direct
foreign investment in Latin America was financed from th
United States.
S A. O. Ilirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why,
Essays in International Finance, no. 76, Princeton University,
1969.
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of such investment and the importance of
monopoly has been developed by Vaitsos6, taking
as a starting point the 'product cycle' theory of
international trade and investment. The technol-
ogical lead of certain firms enables them to earn
monopoly rents. Foreign investment is a way of
attempting to preserve this monopoly position.
The collective nature of the inputs is a way of
extending the monopoly to parts of the package
where, taken singly, a monopoly position would
not operate. The existence of such monopoly rents
opens up the possibility of bargaining between
host governments and multinational corporations.
Strategic Considerations in Bargaining with MNCs
The neo-classical theory of foreign investment
implies that arty proposal from a multinational
corporation which, on a cost-benefit analysis,
shows a positive net value, should be undertaken.
The implicit alternative is that of no foreign in-
vestment and therefore no project. The bargaining
model implies that a positive net present value is
not a sufficient criterion for accepting the invest-
ment for two reasons: first, because the alterna-
tive may not be no project but investment by
another foreign company, or undertaking the pro-ject without direct foreign investment; second,
because it may be possible, through negotiation,
to increase the net present value of the original
project. Once it has been recognized that foreign
investment is not a matter of take it or leave it,
as the neo-classical model implies, but involves
the negotiation of a package which includes a
large number of distinct elements such as profit
remissions, royalty payments, tax treatments,
tariff protection, local content requirements,
export earnings, training of local labour, etc., the
strategic factors in the host government's bar-
gaining position must be considered.
The acquisition of technology which is available
from a number of suppliers obviously presents a
different picture from the case where it is tightly
controlled by one firm. Most of the technology
required by LDCs will be of the former type so
that the competitive structure (at an international
level) of the industry which is being considered
may be an important element in the negotiating
position of the recipient. The more tight-knit the
oligopoly within the industry, the more likely it
is that firms will achieve some kind of collusion
when faced with a government that is prepared to
negotiate the terms which it considers to be most
beneficial. On the other hand, in an industry in
which the oligopoly is less stable as a result of a
6 C. V. Vaitsos, Intercountry Income Distribution and Trans-
national Enterprises, Clarndc'ts Press, Oxford, 1974.
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lower level of concentration, or a recent new
entry, there will be more scope for bargaining.
A second factor which will influence the strength
of the bargaining position of the participants will
be the alternatives which face the host government
in terms of its ability either to undertake the pro-ject without any assistance from abroad, or to
rely on imports to supply the products concerned.
The former is related to the level of technological
development of the host country. The latter
depends on the strategic importance of the indus-
try both in terms of desirability of local produc-
tion and the foreign exchange cost of continued
dependence on imports which determine the
feasibility of such a strategy.
There are a number of further strategic con-
siderations which can be controlled, at least in
part, by host governments. One of the deficiencies
of early attempts at control of foreign investment
has been the piecemeal way in which such policies
have been applied.
This is to a large extent an organizational
problem, deriving from the fact that a number of
government agencies may be involved in deter-
mining various aspects of policy which affect the
MNC, e.g. a royalties committee, the finance min-
istry, the foreign ministry. A firm's ability to
remit the profits may be affected by all of these
agencies since each deals with a different channel
of remission. It is essential, therefore, to have a
co-ordinated policy so that the effect of more
stringent controls on royalty payments, for
instance, will not simply be a higher level of
transfer pricing.
A key element in any process of negotiation is
information. The greater the information which a
host government possesses about a company's
operations the flore likely it is to be able to esti-
mate the margin within which it must settle and
the most favourable terms which can be obtained
from the foreign firm. There is, however, a cost
involved in the search for information, and this
sets limits to the extent to which it will be con-
trolled in practice. Some of the requisite informa-
tion will be specific to individual companies, some
to particular industries and some to the investor's
home country. At a more general level it is
apparent that increased economic understanding
of foreign investment is also an important element
in bargaining. Since the objectives of firm and
government differ, the firm being concerned
mainly with long-run profit maximization and the
government with increased employment, an im-
provement in the balance of payments, an increase
in the country's technological capacity, etc., the
situation cannot be described as a zero-sum game.
The firm may be prepared to increase its exports
in return for a guaranteed rate of return. The
government may be prepared to accept such an
arrangement because of its effects on the balance
of payments.
Inter-governmental co-operation is an important
element in successful negotiation in the extractive
industries but less so in the case of manufacturing
investment, where the key factor in the bargaining
position of the host country is access to the
country's domestic market. In extractive industries
the key element is access to a natural resource
which may also be available elsewhere. Neverthe-
less, producer organizations such as OPEC have
also played a role in the dissemination of in-
formation among member countries, for example,
concerning the terms which have been negotiated
with other governments. This strengthens the bar-
gaining position of the producer country.
A danger to be avoided in negotiating the admis-
sion of foreign investment is to regard this as a
once-for-all affair. There must be a system for
continuous policing of the agreement, and also
the possibilities of termination or renegotiation.
This is vital since the agreement should be seen
as a means of developing a local technological
capacity which will either render it ultimately un-
necessary or enable renegotiation on terms more
favourable to the host government. Thus the
government should not freeze the original terms
of the agreement but on the contrary, keep its
options open as far as possible.7
The Chilean Motor Industry Negotiations
The Chilean motor industry at the time of the
election of President Allende in 1970 consisted of
ten companies which produced 24,591 vehicles in
that year. The output of each firm varied from
120 to 5,634, and although the nominal local con-
tent required by the government was 58 per cent
of the value of the vehicle, most companies
achieved this percentage through importing parts
from other LAFTA countries (mainly Argentina)
and making compensatory exports of certain
simple parts such as radiators and springs. The
industry was therefore essentially an assembly
industry. The major mechanical and body parts
were all imported.
During the 1960s some rationalization of the
motor industry had occurred as a result of the
government's policy of increasing local content
requirements, and the number of firms had been
halved. By the late I 960s, however, the limits of
such a policy had been reached without anything
like the volume of production required to take
7 See R. Koplinsky, 'Control and Transfer rf Technologcal
Agreements', IDS Bulletin, vol. 6 no. 4, March 1975.
advantage of economies of scale having been
achieved. The Unidad Popular Government
decided therefore to attempt a direct restructuring
of the Chilean motor industry with the following
objectives:
"(a) to produce commercial vehicles and cars for
mass consumption;
to develop the technology of national industry,
especially the metal-mechanical industries, and
create infrastructural conditions which permit the
development of new high technology industries
for export;
to create, directly or indirectly, high produc-
tivity jobs;
to obtain fiscal resources and appropriate
economic surpluses;
to compensate for the foreign exchange ex-
penditures which satisfying the demand for cars
implies;
to obtain the necessary efficiency in the indus-
try in order to be able to exchange with LAFTA
and the Andean Pact without losses for the coun-
try and within the competitive margin."8
It was decided that the most appropriate way of
achieving these ends was to open the industry to
international bidding. The broad outlines of the
form which the development of the industry
should take were laid down in June 1971. The
number of models was to be restricted to one
small car less than 1200cc and its commercial
vehicle derivative (Category A), one medium-sized
car of between 1300 and 2000cc and its commer-
cial vehicle derivative (Category B), and a chassis
with diesel engine for a 6-8 ton lorry and a bus
chassis based on the same mechanical parts
(Category C). It was planned to produce 40,000
vehicles in 1973 rising to 100,000 by 1980, dis-
tributed as follows between the three categories:
In terms of its international market structure the
motor industry was particularly favourable from
the point of view of the host country's bargain-
ing position. Although oligopolistic, with less than
a dozen firms dominating the industry all round
the world, it is still a highly competitive industry
partly because of the challenge to US dominance
by the major European and Japanese manufac-
turers. In the past, this competitiveness, combined
with the liberal policies adopted by most LDCs
towards foreign investment, has led to the frag-
8 D. Parkin, El Consu,no y ¡a Via Chilena al Socia?icmo: Reflex-
iones en torno a la Decision Automotriz (mimeo) 1971, p. 2
on the basis of internal documents of the ComisLn Automotriz.
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1973 1980
Category A 20,000 45,000
Category B 15,000 40,000
Category C 5,000 15,000
mentation of national markets between a large
number of firms and, as a result, small-scale, high
cost production. The Chilean government, by
restricting access to the domestic market, was
able to turn this competitiveness to its own
advantage. Despite the non-participation of the
US firms, each category attached bids from four
companies: British Leyland, Citroen, Fiat and
Renault in small cars, Fiat, Nissan, Peugeot and
Volvo in medium-sized cars and British Leyland,
Fap Famos, Fiat and Pegaso in lorries.
There was little possibility of developing a motor
industry in Chile without foreign technical
assistance in one form or another. The alterna-
tive of importing vehicles rather than local produc-
tion also presented problems, since large-scale
imports would have involved very heavy foreign
exchange costs for the Chilean economy. Any
attempt to place a heavier emphasis on public
transport as opposed to private transport and to
reduce the supply of cars was also rejected
(although some writers argued at the time that
the demand projections, on which the plans for
the motor industry were based, were in fact in-
compatible with the government's declared in-
come redistribution objectives).9 Nevertheless, the
division of the car market into two categories,
small and medium-sized, did provide the govern-
ment with some room for manoeuvre. When in
February 1972 the results of the first round of
bidding were announced, Category B was not
allocated to any firm, since none of the offers
reached the required standard. The government
then declared its intention to meet the demand for
the medium-sized cars by imports, but better
offers were subsequently received from the com-
panies, and the category was finally awarded to
Peugeot. Thus, over a limited sector of the
market, the Unidad Popular Government was
able to use the threat of withholding access to the
market in order to obtain a better bargain.
The Chilean case also illustrates the difficulties
of retaining bargaining within the sector con-
cerned and the problem of political pressure on
the host government. The decision to grant the
contract for producing a lorry and bus chassis to
the Spanish firm Pegaso was much criticized.
Originally Category C was awarded to Fiat with
Pegaso in second place. It had been argued that
the vehicle which Pegaso proposed to produce
was unsuitable for local conditions and that
supply problems could arise in the case of parts
provided from Spain because of the small size
of the parent company. It is generally recognized
that an offer of US $50 million credit from the
9 See Parkin, op. cit. and S. Bitar and E. Moyano,
'Redistribucion del Consumo y Transiciors al Socialismo',
Cuidemos do ¡a Realidad Nacional no. 11, 1972.
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Spanish Government to import grain at a time
when the country was going through a grave
political and economic crisis in October 1972, as
a result of the lorry-owner's strike, was an impor-
tant factor in signing the contract with Pegaso, It
is also significant that Pegaso obtained much more
favourable terms than Citroen and Peugeot who
had already signed contracts in the two car cate-
gories. This was less a reflection of differences in
the bargaining power of the companies concerned
than of the changed economic and political situa-
tion which faced the Chilean government by the
time the latter contract came to be signed.
Another example of political pressure, this time
internal rather than external, led to an agreement
being signed with Nissan in September 1973, a
few days before the military coup, to produce an
intermediate vehicle between the Citroen and
Peugeot models. Before 1970 there had been four
major centres of vehicle assembly in Chile: Anca
in the north where Citröen, British Leyland,
General Motors and some smaller plants were
located, the new plant jointly built by Renault and
Peugeot at Los Andes, the Fiat plant at Rancagua
and the Ford plant at Casablanca. The selection
of Citroen and Peugeot and the decision that
Pegaso should produce at Casablanca meant that
Fiat's plant at Rancagua would have to close
down with the loss of over 1,000 jobs. The Fiat
workers .at Rancagua put pressure on the govern-
ment to continue production at the plant, and an
agreement was reached under which an inter-
mediate vehicle could be accommodated through
a reduction in Citroen's market. Obviously, from
the point of view of the government's policy of
rationalizing the motor industry, this can only be
seen as a retrograde step.
The manner in which the negotiations were
carried out with the foreign motor companies
does provide some useful guidelines for bargain-
ing strategies. The Chilean Development Corpora-
tion (CORFO) was put in charge of the negotia-
tions with the foreign firms, covering such items
as profit remittances, royalty payments, ownership
structure, managerial structure, the supply of
parts, etc. It was thus possible for the government
to pursue an integrated policy and identify pos-
sible trade-offs which would be acceptable to both
parties. The companies appeared prepared to
accept relatively low rates of return (the contracts
specified both a guaranteed minimum and a
maximum) in order to participate in the market,
Citroen accepted a minimum profit rate of 5 per
cent and a maximum of 10 per cent, while for
Peugeot the two were equal at 6.5 per cent, and
for Pegaso they were 6.5 per cent and 12 per
cent respectively.
The government's main concern was to minimize
the foreign exchange costs of the motor industry
since it was found that other aspects of the pro-
posals submitted, such as investment require-
ments, did not differ greatly between projects.
Thus the difference between export earnings and
the cost of imports of parts and remissions of
profits and technical assistance fees became a
major element in the negotiations. This is exempli-
fied by the case of medium-sized cars. As men-
tioned earlier, none of the projects in this category
was accepted initially. The reason given was that
even the most favourable offer would have
involved an outflow of foreign exchange of US
$130 million over the ten years of the agreement.
The contract finally signed with Peugeot reduced
the foreign exchange costs to US $3 million,
mainly as a result of increased exports. The
original Peugeot offer undertook to export only
gear boxes and back-axles, the annual value of
which would be less than US $2 million. Apart
from this commitment, the firm indicated its
willingness merely to encourage exports of
Chilean copper to France, and to study the pos-
sibility of exporting finished vehicles to Eastern
Europe. (It would hardly need a very profound
study to suggest that the latter possibility was
negligible.) In the contract eventually signed with
Peugeot, exports were increased to more than
US $100 million over an eight-year period, and
motor industry products accounted for three-
quarters of these exports. On a less spectacular
scale, the Chilean government was able to nego-
tiate a four-fold increase in Citroen's exports over
the level initially proposed by the company. This
meant that there would be no net outflow of
foreign exchange from the Citröen operation.
The pioneering nature of the Chilean govern-
ment's negotiations with the motor manufacturers
meant that there was probably little information
available about the operations of these companies
in other countries. For the form in which the
proposals of the companies had to be submitted, a
considerable body of information about the
parent company and its international operations
had to be collected for use in the course of nego-
tiation. The decision to form joint ventures in
which CORFO would have a majority participa.
lion was one manner of ensuring a flow of in
formation once the companies were in operation
Similarly the need for continuing control of the
multinational corporations was also partly met by
majority ownership and by the fact that eight of
the Il directors, including the managing director,
were to be appointed by CORFO and the firm's
workers. The original contracts were to cover a
ten-year period, after which they could be re-
negotiated or terminated by the government buy-
ing out the minority shareholders. This provided
some room for manoeuvre for the government at
the end of ten years.
Conclusion
The coup of September 1973 makes it impos-
sible to assess the success of the policy followed
by the Unidad Popular Government in the motor
industry, and in any event such an exercise would
be beyond the scope of this paper. But the case
of the Chilean motor industry negotiations does
illustrate the scope that exists for bargaining
between host governments and multinational cor-
porations. Contrary to the implications of the
neo-classical model, government policy towards
foreign investment is not simply a matter of decid-
ing whether it is a good thing or not. Host
country relations with multinational corporations
involve a whole complex of issues and require an
integrated approach.
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